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In a series of recent papers, Hirota and Yuen claim to have identified a fundamental flaw in the
theory underlying quantum cryptography, which would invalidate existing security proofs. In this
short note, we sketch their argument and show that their conclusion is unjustified—it originates
from a confusion between necessary and sufficient criteria for secrecy.
The purpose of this note is to refute a critique by Hi-
rota [1] and Yuen [2–9] concerning a basic criterion for
secrecy [10, 11], which is widely used in quantum cryp-
tography and, in particular, serves as a basis for modern
security proofs of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). We
first explain this criterion and then describe Hirota and
Yuen’s critique as well as the error in their argument.
Secrecy in quantum cryptography. Realistic
cryptographic keys (e.g., those obtained by QKD) are
usually not perfectly secret. Rather, their secrecy is
quantified by a parameter, ε ≥ 0, which bounds the maxi-
mum tolerated deviation from an ideal key, i.e., a key that
is perfectly uniformly distributed and independent of any
information held by a potential adversary. Formally, a
key S is said to be ε-secret if the maximum advantage
for distinguishing S from an ideal key is at most ε [13].
This definition guarantees that, in any application that
is secure when using an ideal key (such as one-time-pad
encryption), one may also use an ε-secret key instead,
with ε corresponding to the failure probability caused by
this replacement [14]. The notion of ε-secrecy enables
modular proofs of security, which is why one also refers
to it as universally composable (UC) secrecy.
For the considerations below, we will assume that the
key S is a bit string of length ℓ (a typical value is ℓ = 106)
and that ε > 0 is a small but strictly positive constant
(for concreteness, one may set ε = 10−20, which is achiev-
able by QKD and, at the same time, sufficient for all
practical purposes [15]).
Most modern quantum cryptographic security proofs,
in order to establish secrecy of a key S, rely on a math-
ematical criterion introduced in [10, 11]. The criterion
is based on the trace distance [16], which we denote by
d(·, ·), and demands that
d
(
ρSE , ρ¯S ⊗ ρE) ≤ ε , (TD)
where ρSE denotes the joint state of the key S and the
information E held by the adversary, and ρ¯S is a com-
pletely mixed state (corresponding to a uniformly dis-
tributed S). The use of this criterion is justified by the
following implication [10, 11]
(TD) =⇒ (UC secrecy) . (1)
Recent scepticism. Hirota [1] and Yuen [2–9] ar-
gue that the standard secrecy criterion (TD) does not
actually imply secrecy, i.e., that the above implication is
wrong (unless the parameter ε in (TD) is chosen exponen-
tially small in the key size). For concreteness, we refer in
the following specifically to the paper by Hirota [1]. We
note, however, that the argument is similar in spirit to
Yuen’s reasoning [2–9] and, in fact, based on the latter.
The critique is built upon an alternative criterion that
can be used to establish the secrecy of a key S. The cri-
terion demands that the probability P (S|E) that an ad-
versary with knowledge E can correctly guess S is small,
i.e.,
P (S|E) ∼ 2−ℓ (HY)
where ℓ is the length of S. It is then argued that this
criterion is sufficient for secrecy, i.e.,
(HY) =⇒ (UC secrecy) . (2)
This implication is correct (if one takes the approxima-
tion in (HY) to mean that the relative error between the
left and right hand side of ∼ is at most ε) [17]. Further-
more, by explicit examples (p. 5 of [1]), it is shown, again
correctly, that [18]
(TD) 6=⇒ (HY) . (3)
Hirota now seems to argue that (2) and (3) together
imply that (1) is wrong. This conclusion is, however,
logically wrong. It would only hold if the implication
in (2) went in the other direction, i.e., if (HY) was not
only a sufficient, but also a necessary criterion for UC
secrecy. But this is not true, as one can convince oneself
by a simple example [19].
We conclude by remarking that the claim of Hirota and
Yuen, if it would have been valid, would not only shake
the foundations of quantum cryptography, but have an
equally drastic impact on classical cryptography, where
similar secrecy criteria are used [20]. However, as shown
here, their claim is false.
[1] Osamu Hirota, Incompleteness and Limit of Quantum
Key Distribution Theory, arXiv:1208.2106v2 (2012).
[2] Horace P. Yuen, Unconditional Security In Quantum Key
2Distribution, arXiv:1205.5065 (2012).
[3] Horace P. Yuen, Problems of Security Proofs and Funda-
mental Limit on Key Generation Rate in Quantum Key
Distribution, arXiv:1205.3820 (2012).
[4] Horace P. Yuen, Security Significance of the Trace
Distance Criterion in Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1109.2675 (2011).
[5] Horace P. Yuen, Fundamental And Practical Problems of
QKD Security — the Actual and the Perceived Situation,
arXiv:1109.1066 (2011).
[6] Horace P. Yuen, Problems of Existing Uncondi-
tional Security Proofs in Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1109.1051 (2011).
[7] Horace P. Yuen, Fundamental Quantitative Security
In Quantum Key Distribution, Physical Review A 82,
062304 (2010).
[8] Horace P. Yuen, Universality and The Criterion ‘d’ in
Quantum Key Generation, arXiv:0907.4694 (2009).
[9] Horace P. Yuen, Key Generation: Foundations and
a New Quantum Approach, IEEE Journal of Selected
Topics in Quantum Electronics, vol. 15, pp. 1630–1645
(2009).
[10] Michael Ben-Or, Michal Horodecki, Debbie W. Leung,
Dominic Mayers, and Jonathan Oppenheim: The Uni-
versal Composable Security of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion, Proc. of TCC 2005, LNCS, Springer, vol. 3378, pp.
386–406 (2005).
[11] Renato Renner and Robert Ko¨nig, Universally Com-
posable Privacy Amplification Against Quantum Adver-
saries, Proc. of TCC 2005, LNCS, Springer, vol. 3378,
pp. 407–425 (2005).
[12] Luca Trevisan, Extractors and Pseudorandom Genera-
tors, Journal of the ACM, vol. 48, pp. 860–879 (2001).
[13] Consider a hypothetical experiment where a distinguisher
D, which has access to all information held by the ad-
versary, is presented with one of two possible keys, S
or S¯. The advantage of D for distinguishing S from S¯
is then defined as the difference between the probabil-
ity that the distinguisher outputs 1 in the two cases, i.e.,∣
∣Prob[D(S) = 1]−Prob[D(S¯) = 1]
∣
∣. Maximizing this over
all possible distinguishers D gives the maximum advan-
tage for distinguishing S from S¯.
[14] More precisely, when using an ε-secret key S in an appli-
cation, the probability of any event (e.g., that an adver-
sary can correctly guess an encrypted message) is upper
bounded by p+ ε, where p is the probability of the same
event in an ideal scenario, where S is replaced by an ideal
key.
[15] Since ε is an upper bound on the probability of a failure
caused by the imperfection of the secret key (as explained
above), it is generally sufficient to choose ε smaller than
the probability of a security breach due to other imperfec-
tions (e.g., a hardware problem leading to a key leakage).
[16] For two density operators, ρ and σ, the trace distance is
defined by d(ρ, σ) := 1
2
‖ρ− σ‖1, where ‖ · ‖1 denotes the
trace norm.
[17] In [1], this claim is formulated as part of a definition (Def-
inition 3), which may have contributed to the confusion.
[18] To understand the difference between criteria (TD)
and (HY), one may consider the special case where E is
trivial, i.e., uncorrelated to S. In this case, criterion (TD)
corresponds to the requirement that the probabilities of
S are on average not much larger than 2−ℓ (the probabil-
ities of a uniform distribution), whereas criterion (HY)
demands that all probabilities of S are (approximately)
bounded by 2−ℓ.
[19] Let ε = 10−20 and let S¯ be an ideal (perfectly uniform
and secret) key of length ℓ = 106. Furthermore, let S be a
key that is identical to S¯, except if S¯ is equal to the zero
string, S¯ = 0 = 00 · · · 0, in which case we set S = 1 =
11 · · · 1. Hence, by construction, the probability that S
deviates from the ideal key S¯ is upper bounded by 2−ℓ ≤
ε, i.e., S is UC secret. However, the probability that S =
1 is twice as large as it should be for a uniform string.
Hence, an adversary guessing S = 1 would have a success
probability of 2 · 2−ℓ, thus violating criterion (HY).
[20] For example, the definition of randomness extractors—a
concept widely used in cryptography—is based on a clas-
sical special case of criterion (TD) (with the trace dis-
tance replaced by its classical analogue, the variational
or statistical distance); see, e.g., [12].
